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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION SAFETY:
PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE FATAL ACCIDENT RATE
AND THE DEBATE OVER DATA PROTECTION
EvAN

P. SINGER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

S INCE THE EARLY 1980s, the commercial aviation fatal acci-

dent rate has remained statistically insignificant but relatively
static. Given the projected growth in twenty-first century commercial aviation, however, a static accident rate assumes far
greater significance. In fact, one study cited by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) found that combining the projected
growth in commercial aviation traffic with a flat fatal accident
rate will translate into a "major hull loss every week to ten days,
somewhere in the world, by the year 2015."' Many leading aviation organizations naturally describe these projections as
"wholly unacceptable. 2 In response, the aviation industry has
attempted to reduce the fatal accident rate by developing new
safety programs that focus on the collection, analysis and dissemination of aviation safety data.
Many of these initiatives have already taken form. In the
United States, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) has begun a crusade for mandatory installation of cockpit-view video recorders while airlines and the FAA attempt to
devise two major programs designed to increase the availability
and analysis of voluntarily-submitted aviation safety data: the Air* The author wishes to thank the many aviation professionals who contributed
their time and knowledge in order to make this paper a success.
See Office of System Safety, U.S. FAA, The Global Aviation Information Network
(GAIN): Using Information Proactively to Improve Aviation Safety (May 2000), available
at http://www.asy.faa.gov/gain/WhatlIsGAIN/GAINUsing%20InfoProactively.htm [hereinafter GAIN Overview]. See also U.S. FAA, 1999 Annual Report,
Aviation Safety Statistical Handbook (1999).
2 National Civil Aviation Review Commission Public Hearing, Oct. 8, 1997
(opening remarks of Chairman Norman Mineta), available at www.faa.gov/
ncarc/safetestimony/transcript.doc.
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line Safety Action Partnership Program (ASAP) and the Flight
Operations Quality Assurance Program (FOQA). The industry
hopes that data retrieved from these programs can then be
shared across cockpits, airlines and international borders to
help reduce the fatal accident rate.
Similar programs are underway in Europe as well. For example, the FOQA program being developed in the United States is
modeled after a similar program operated for decades at British
Airways.' More recently, the European Civil Aviation Conference and Joint Aviation Authority combined forces to initiate
the ECAC/JAA Aviation Safety Action Program. And third, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recently
promulgated "a series of recommendations designed to
strengthen aircraft accident prevention through enhanced reporting systems and more efficient sharing of safety-related
information."4
Ultimately, the aviation industry anticipates that these programs will help reduce the fatal accident rate and therefore increase air safety. In principle, these programs strive to provide
concerned industry professionals and overseers with better information that, viewed in the aggregate, forms trends and patterns upon which airlines and governmental regulators can act.
In sum, airlines hope that informational awareness will provide
early detection of potential problems, thereby avoiding future
airline accidents and losing fewer lives.
Several obstacles stand in the way of successfully implementing these programs, however. First, many industry organizations
believe the NTSB proposal for mandatory cockpit-view video recorders is misplaced as a reactive, post-accident investigatory
tool rather than a proactive accident-prevention tool. These
criticisms of proposed cockpit video monitoring, however, are
the professed benefits of the ASAP and FOQA programs. Second, industry professionals desire statutory safeguards for retrieved data, since any incentive to voluntarily submit data would
be negated by a regulatory policy of "kill the messenger." Moreover, industry groups argue for statutory protection to quell the
misuse or misappropriation of the data for purposes or parties
3 Captain Mads H. Brandt, The Next Generation FOQA Programs (Apr. 1999),
available at http:/ /www.ntsb.gov/events/symp-rec/proceedings/authors/
brandt.htm.
4 Press Release, International Civil Aviation Organization, Accident Prevention
Recommendations Complement Recent Global Aviation Safety Initiatives (Oct. 1,
1999), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/pio9912.htm.
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other than those responsible for enhancing air safety, such as
the news media or potential post-crash litigants.
Though these obstacles present significant challenges to the
industry, many of these proposals will likely become a reality in
the coming months and years. This Comment provides a summary of four recent proposals and the resulting debate. In so
doing, this Comment is divided into three broad areas composed of ten sections. First, the Comment examines the statistical, technological and regulatory environment in which the
recent proposals have been made, including a discussion of
cockpit voice recorders. Building from that framework, this
Comment next examines the first proposal, cockpit video monitoring. And finally, this Comment examines the three remaining proposals that rely primarily on voluntarily-submitted
aviation safety data: the Airline Safety Action Partnership
(ASAP), the Flight Operations Quality Assurance program
(FOQA) and the Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN).
II.

A.

STATISTICAL BACKGROUND

RECENT AND PROJECTED GROWTH IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION

Despite its relative infancy as a form of transportation, commercial aviation has experienced nearly exponential growth
since the late 1990s. In 1982, a commercial airliner departed an
airport in the United States slightly over five million times. 5 In
1999, however, more than eleven million commercial airliners
took to the sky.6 Flight hours have also dramatically increased
from under seven million in 1982 to over sixteen million in
1999. 7 And, according to the NTSB, "[a] t the nation's 10 busiest
airports, aircraft operations have increased by 44 percent, on average, in the last 10 years, and are projected to grow by another
27 percent in the next 10 years."8
The growth rate of commercial aviation in the twenty-first
century is expected to, quite literally, take off. In the United
States, for example, the Department of Transportation expects
5 NTSB, Table 6 Accidents, Fatalities, and Rates, 1982-2000, for U.S. Air Carriers

Operating Under CFR 121, Scheduled Service (Airlines), at http://www. Ntsb.gov/aviation/Table6htm (listing 5,162,346 airline departures in 1982) [hereinafter Table
6].
6 Id. (listing 11,160,000 airline departures in 1999).
7 Id.
8 NTSB Chairman James Hall, Remarks to the Global Airline Industry Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://

www.ntsb.gov/speeches/hcOO 1129.htm [hereinafter Hall Remarks].
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commercial aviation enplanements to grow from a 1995 level of
544.8 million to 925.6 million in 2008,9 an increase of nearly
70%. In November 2000, NTSB Chairman Jim Hall cited the
following statistics in his remarks to the Global Airline Industry
Program:
By 2010, domestic enplanements will grow from 561 million to
over 850 million; the domestic commercial air carrier fleet will
increase from just over 5,000 aircraft to more than 7,500 aircraft;
the worldwide fleet [will] double in size to 20,000 aircraft by
2010; and the number of our citizens traveling by air will increase
from 126 million to 230 million. 0
International organizations make similar projections. As of
October 23, 2000, the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) predicts the annual average growth rate for scheduled international passenger traffic will hit 5.6%." I According
to IATA, this means that by 2004, "the number of passengers on
international scheduled services will rise by over 150 million...
to a 2004 level of 643.1 million."' 2
B.

THE FATAL ACCIDENT RATE

For the last ten to twenty years, the commercial aviation accident rate has remained relatively unchanged.13 According to
NTSB statistics, in 1982 scheduled air carriers 14 suffered 0.058
fatal accidents per 100,000 departures, while in 1994 the rate
had changed little to 0.051 fatal accidents per 100,000 departures.' 5 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
has observed a nearly identical international trend.' 6
9 Table 12, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1997.
10 Hall Remarks, supra note 8.
11 Press Release, International Air Transportation Association, JATA: Most Bullish Passenger/CargoMarket Outlook for Three Years (Oct. 23, 2000), available at http:/
/www.iata.org/pr/pr0ooctc.htm.
12 Id.
13 Office of System Safety, U.S. FAA, The Global Analysis and Information Network
(GAIN): Worldwide Sharing, Analysis and Dissemination of Aviation Safety Information
(June 1997), available at http://www.asy.faa.gov/gain/GAN_information/
GAIN_worldwidesharing.htm.
14 Air carriers operating under 14 C.F.R. § 121
[hereinafter Part 121].
15 Table 6, supra note 5. See also 1999 Annual Report, supra note 1.
11 ICAO, Annual Report of the Council - 1999, at 10 (1999), available at http://
www.icao.org [hereinafter ICAO Annual Report] (showing that since 1980 the
worldwide number of fatal accidents per 100,000 million landings has varied between 0.1 and 0.2).
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In the last several years, however, the fatal accident rate appears to be in decline. In the United States, for instance, air
carriers suffered 0.018 fatal accidents per 100,000 departures in
1999, down from 0.051 fatal accidents in 1994.17 The worldwide
rate seems to be declining as well, in 1999 hitting its lowest annual rate in twenty years.' 8
III. TECHNOLOGICAL AND REGULATORY
BACKGROUND: COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS
To fully understand the current debates over data collecting
devices and potential statutory protection of their work product,
it is necessary to begin with an overview of the technological and
regulatory framework applicable to current devices, such as the
cockpit voice recorder (CVR). It is within this framework that
future programs, such as the cockpit video recorders and voluntary-data collection and analysis, will operate.
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS

According to a paper published by Dennis Grossi of the National Transportation Safety Board, airborne recording devices,
including cockpit voice recorders, have been placed in airline
cockpits for decades.'" The Civil Aviation Authority' issued the
first flight data recorder 2' l regulation in 1957, mandating the installation of crash-protected flight recorders in transport category aircraft byJuly 1, 1958.22 Since that time, the regulation of
airborne recorders has mirrored technology's ability to record
more and more parameters,2 3 including voice communications.
17

Table 6, supra note 5.

18 ICAO Annual Report, supra note 16, at 10.

19 For a meticulous history of aviation data recorders, see Dennis R. Grossi,
Aviation Recorder Overview, availableat http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/query.asp (last
visited Sept. 1, 2002).
20 The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
are predecessors of the Federal Aviation Administration. Id.
21 A Flight Data Recorder (FDR) electronically monitors and records aircraft
performance characteristics such as speed, heading, altitude, and engine thrust.
See Grossi, supra note 19. See also http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/CVRFDR.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
22 Grossi, supra note 19.

23 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.344 (1997) (requiring all transport airplanes manufactured after Aug. 18, 2000 to carry an FDR able to record at least fifty-seven parameters, and airplanes manufactured after Aug. 18, 2002 to record at least eightyeight parameters). See also Grossi, supra note 19, at 4.
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To that extent, the FAA mandated the installation of cockpit
voice recorders in transport aircraft in 1966.24
In response to recent technological developments, in 1999
the NTSB recommended that the FAA strengthen its airborne
recorder requirements. On March 9, 1999, the NTSB recommended that all newly manufactured airplanes should carry
both a CVR and FDR fitted with two combined voice and data
recorders, one recorder located as close to the cockpit as practical and the other as far aft as practical..2 5 The NTSB also recommended that by 2005, all existing aircraft should be retrofitted
with a 2-hour solid-state CVR that is fitted with an independent
power supply capable of operating the CVR and area
microphone for 10 minutes when aircraft power to the CVR is
lost. 26 In theory, the FAA has agreed to these recommendations
and is currently authoring a Notice of Proposed Rule Making on
27
the subject.
B.

PROTECTION OF COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS BY U.S. LAw

The United States Code places two restrictions on the availability of information obtained from a cockpit voice recorder.
First, federal law prohibits the NTSB from publicly disclosing
"any part of a cockpit voice recorder recording or transcript of
2
oral communications by and between flight crew members
that the Board finds irrelevant to the accident or incident.2 9 Second, federal law prohibits litigants from compelling discovery of
information obtained from a cockpit voice recorder. Importantly, 49 U.S.C. § 1154 specifically protects any recording obtained from a CVR-"" as well as any portion of the transcript that
the NTSB "has not made available to the public. 3- 1 Only a determination by the court, based on an in camera review of the
data, that the information sought is so vital that its absence
would preclude the moving party from a fair trial, will non-public portions be made available. 2 There is no exception to the
protection of the audio recording.
Grossi, supra note 19.
25 NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-99-16 through 18 (Mar. 9, 1999).
26 Id.
27 See Grossi, supra note 19, at 5.
2- 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (1994).
29 1d.
3- 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1994).
31 Id. § 1154(a)(1)(A).
32 Id. § 1154(a) (2) (A).
24
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Courts have generally upheld the protections against discovery of cockpit voice recordings, including challenges based
upon the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)." One court, for
example, upheld the NTSB's decision to withhold the CVR tape
from a plaintiff who brought suit after the crash of United Airlines Flight 585 at Colorado Springs, Colorado. 4 The plaintiff
in McGilvra sought to compel the release of the CVR tape pursuant to FOIA. The court, however, found that 49 U.S.C.
§ 1114(c) falls within "subsection (A) of FOIA's Exemption 3"
and therefore concluded that the NTSB "properly denied the
plaintiff's FOIA request."3 5
At least one other court has not only limited access to the
cockpit voice recorder, but found the entire NTSB accident reWhile this extremely protectionist atport to be inadmissible."
titude presents the minority view, courts almost uniformly find
only the factual portions of NTSB accident reports are
admissible."
C.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS

American jurisprudence corresponds with general international sentiment: cockpit video recordings should be protected
by law. In Canada, "[e]very on-board recording 8 is privileged
and . . . no person . . . shall knowingly communicate an onboard recording or permit it to be communicated to any person." ,9 Moreover, the privilege afforded by Canadian law includes the production of any on-board recording (or evidence
33 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1990).
34 McGilvra v. NTSB, 840 F. Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1993).

Id. at 102-3.
In re Air Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989, 780 F. Supp. 1207
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
37 Most courts only admit into evidence the factual portions of NTSB accident
reports. See e.g.,
Am. Airlines v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969) (upholding limited admissibility of only factual portions); Berguido v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963) (limiting admissibility to factual portions
of the NTSB accident report and excluding any conclusions of probable cause);
In re Air Crash at Charlotte, North Carolina on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1071,
1075 (D.S.C. 1996) (finding that courts have "routinely admitted the factual portions of investigative reports generated after an airline disaster" and doing the
35
36

same).
38 "On-board recording" is defined to include "a recording of voice communications originating from, or received on or in, the flight deck of an aircraft."
Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, S.C. 1989
ch. 3,§ 28(1)(a) (1989) (Can.).
39 Id. at S.C. 1989, ch. 3,§ 28 (2).
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thereof) in "any legal, disciplinary or other proceedings."' The
United Kingdom recently adopted a similar position that, subject to limited exceptions, no "relevant record shall be made
available ... to any person for purposes other than accident or
incident investigation."41

The International Civil Aviation Organization also asserts a
protective attitude in Annex 13, which governs aircraft accident
investigations. According to Chapter 5.12 of Annex 13:
The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident, where it occurred, shall not make the following records
available for purposes other than accident or incident investigation, unless the appropriate authority ... determines that their
disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future investigations:
d) cockpit voice
recordings and transcripts from such
42
recordings.

While some countries4 3 have yet to statutorily prevent unauthorized use of cockpit voice recordings, a significant percentage of the world's most prominent aviation organizations and
countries, including the United States, have legislation aimed at
protecting information obtained by a CVR. Having surveyed the
modern treatment of cockpit voice recorders under both U.S.
and international law, we can now turn to the first proposed
safety initiative: the cockpit view video camera.
IV. THE PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY COCKPIT
VIDEO RECORDERS
A.

TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY

Video technology is not a recent development, even with respect to its use in aviation. It has been used in conjunction with
airplane simulators for flight crew training purposes as well as
for scientific research. For example, one study concerning sleep
deprivation of flight crews and its affect on their performance
Id. at S.C. 1989, ch. 3, § 28 (2)(b).
Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Order 2000 (SI
2000 No. 1345) (May 17, 2000).
42 International Civil Aviation Organization, Chicago Convention on International
Aviation, Annex 13 Ch. 5.12, 8th Ed. 1994. See also New Zealand Air Line Pilot
Ass'n v. Att'y Gen., [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 269.
43 For example, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland do not protect information obtained from cockpit voice recorders.
40

41
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collected video data from a Boeing 747-400 simulator.4 4 Moving
the camera from the controlled simulator environment to an
uncontrolled cockpit, however, presents a new set of both technological and economic problems. And, while video technology
has historically been unable to overcome these obstacles, modern digital technology appears to have made the leap into technological and economic feasibility.
As the leaders of the cockpit-view video recorder movement,
the NTSB has championed these technological improvements.
In his testimony during the Egypt 990 hearings, NTSB Chairman Hall highlighted several of the recent technological advances, including "video compression technology, solid state
memory, and the availability of high quality, inexpensive cameras."4 5 At least one other expert now believes that in the future, all the airborne recorders will be combined into "combi"
units, recording audio, data and video in a single "Black Box."4 6
And, importantly for post-crash analysis, Chairman Hall noted
that "[s]olid state technology coupled with video compression
techniques will now permit the storage of video recording in a
crash hardened recorder."4 7 Given these developments, the
NTSB now believes that it has become "technically and economically feasible"4 8 to capture and record "images of what is hap49
pening inside the cockpit.
B.

THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL: USAIR FLIGHT

427

The National Transportation Safety Board originally proposed installing cockpit-view video recorders after investigating
USAir (now US Airways) Flight 105 in 1989."' According to the
44 See Methodologies and Metrics: Utility of new video-based techniquefor detection and
measurement of drowsiness on the flight deck, at http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/
projects/ihs/methodologies.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
45 Issues Arising Out of the Egypt Air Crash, 106th Cong. 85 (2000) (statement of
Jim Hall, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board) [hereinafter Hall Testimony]. See also Mike Horne, Future Video Accident Recorders (1999) ("[R]ecent
developments in Digital Video Recording technology can be used in the aerospace environment to achieve the aims of air accident investigators.").
46 Hall Testimony, supra note 45.
47 Id.

48

Hall Remarks, supra note 8, at 5.

49 Id. See also Safety Recommendation A-99-16 through 18, supra note 25 (stating

that "[v]ideo recording of the cockpit environment on newly manufactured airplanes is now technologically and economically feasible.").
50 NTSB, USAir Flight 105: Boeing 737-200, N283AU; Kansas City International
Airport, Missouri; September 8, 1989. Aircraft Incident Report NTSB/AAR-90/04
(1990) [hereinafter USAir 105].
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NTSB report, the crew commenced a premature descent while
on an instrument approach to Kansas City International Airport
in instrument meteorological conditions. 5' The airplane eventually struck and severed four electrical transmission cables located approximately 7,000 feet short of the landing runway
threshold.5 " No persons onboard the airplane were injured,
and although suffering a dual hydraulic system loss, the airplane
executed a successful missed approach and landed safely at
nearby Salina, Kansas.53
The Board's investigation into the cause of the incident, however, was significantly hampered because of a limitation on the
recording length of the installed cockpit voice recorder. According to the Board, "[b]ecause USAir 105 flew for more than
1 hour after the incident, no CVR record of conversations that
occurred during the incident was retained. ' 5 1 Consequently, the
Board stressed the need for "longer playing CVRs, which can
record cockpit sounds for as long5 as 2 hours" as well as potential
"long-playing video recordings.

In making its case, the Board first cited several then-recent
accidents in which it believes a cockpit video recorder would
have been helpful. Two such incidents included a runway overrun by a Piedmont Airlines Boeing 737 in 1987, as well as a 1988
accident involving a Delta Airlines Boeing 727 which crashed
because the flaps were incorrectly set for takeoff.56 In both

cases, the Board surmised that a cockpit-view video recorder
would have facilitated the determination of possible crew actions that remained ambiguous on the CVR recording (such as
whether the crew set the wing flaps correctly and/or properly
armed the spoilers).5
Second, although the USAir Flight 105 investigation 58 did not
present the NTSB with this problem, the Board nonetheless argued that cockpit video monitoring could help overcome
problems arising from a new generation of electronic flight in51

Id. at 36.

52 ht. at Executive Summary.
53

Id.

54 Id. at 50. See also 14 C.F.R. § 125.227(d) (1988) (requiring CVRs to record

no less than thirty minutes of elapsed time before erasing).
55 USAir 105, supra note 50, at 50.
56 Id. at 51.
57 Id.
58 The

aircraft involved in USAir Flight 105 was N283AU, a Boeing 737-200A,
delivered to USAir in 1983. See id. at 7.
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struments, called a "glass cockpit. ''51 While traditional rounddial gages typically freeze upon impact and therefore provide
investigators with pre-impact information such as airspeed, descent rate and/or engine thrust settings, next generation "glass"
cockpits have no memory and provide the investigator with little evidence of the computer display's status up to, or at the time
of, an air accident.6 0 In essence, the computer and monitors
simply go blank, leaving little (if any) evidence of the pre-impact
information provided to the flight crew. Post-crash investigation
consequently becomes more difficult. In response, the Board
concluded "as the introduction of aircraft with electronic 'glass'
cockpit instrumentation to line service continues, the value of
cockpit video recordings will increase as an aid to investigators
attempting to determine the status of the cockpit instrumentation presented to the flightcrew."6 Given the current trend of
fleet modernization among U.S. airlines, the Board's renewed
recommendation for cockpit-view video recorders is hardly
surprising.

C.

A

RENEWED CALL: PART

135 OPERATORS

Despite concern about "glass cockpits" and avionics modernization, the NTSB did not initially revitalize its crusade for cockpit-view video recorders in the context of "glass cockpit"
airplanes. Instead, slightly over eleven years after the USAir 105
investigation, the NTSB proposed the mandatory installation of
cockpit-view video recorders in generally smaller, air taxi and
charter airplanes operated under 14 C.F.R § 135 (hereinafter
Part 135).62
Once again, the Board's recommendation stemmed from a
series of accident investigations, this time involving Part 135 operators. According to the NTSB, these investigations were hindered by the loss of flight recorder data due to the interruption
of aircraft electrical power." Specifically, the Board cited the
59 A "glass cockpit" refers to a modern airplane cockpit dominated by large
computer screens, such as the "Next Generation" Boeing 737 or Airbus A320,
instead of the traditional "round-dial" gages of earlier airplanes, such as the Boeing 727 or Boeing 737-200A. See Safety Recommendation A-99-16 through 18,
supra note 25. See also USAir 105, supra note 50, at 51.
60 See Horne, supra note 45, at 3.
61 USAir 105, supra note 50, at 51.
62 NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-99-59 through 63 (Feb. 8, 2000).
63

Id.

510

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

crash of a Cessna C-208B 6 4 as an example of aircraft "not
equipped with a conventional CVR or FDR [that] have, on average, 140 accidents or incidents per year, resulting in more than
100 fatalities per year.165 Because these airplanes lack airborne
recording devices, accident investigation and analysis becomes
difficult.6 "
On February 8, 2000, the NTSB officially recommended that
the FAA incorporate proposed standards67 for a crash-protective
video recording system into a technical standards order6" and
then:
Require, within 5 years of a technical standards orders' issuance,
the installation of a crash-protective video recording system on
all turbine-powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category
aircraft in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operations
that are not currently required to be equipped with a crashworthy flight recorder device." 9
The FAA officially responded to the NTSB recommendation
in a letter dated May 3, 2000. "' In the letter, the FAA "agree [d]
with the intent of [the] safety recommendation, but [could not]
commit to the timeframe requested by the Board."'7' In contrast
to the Board's sense of urgency, the FAA argued for further research before it would make regulatory changes. According to
the FAA, "the issue of installing of crash-protective video recording equipment ...and the appropriate timeframe for the instalAccording to the NTSB accident investigation, N12022 crashed about 18
nautical miles southwest of Montrose, Colorado, killing all nine persons aboard.
The flight was operated by the U.S. Department of the Interior. See NTSB, Accident IRqort DCA98MA002, available at http://www.ntsb.gov.
65 Safety Recommendation A-99-60, supra note 62.
66 Investigation of N12022 proved especially difficult since the flight was operated tinder Visual Flight Rules (VFR) from an airport without an air traffic control tower. Further, the flight attempted no further communications with an air
traffic control facility. See NTSB, Accident Report DCA98MAO02, supra note 64.
67To support the development of technical standards for cockpit video recorders, the NTSB currently participates in Working Group 50 of the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE). According to Working
Group Chairman P. Plantin de Hugues, the Group's reports should be available
by February 2001. See NTSB Safety Recommendation A-99-59 (1999). See also
Plantin de Hugues, Philippe, EUROCAE WG-50 Activity: Aircraft on Board Video Recording, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/symprec/proceedings/authors/plantindehugues.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
(l NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-99-59 throuh 63, supra note 62. Feb. 8, 2000.
C,9Id.
70 FAA Response to A-99-60, available at http://www.asy.faa.gov/lib/vtopic.exe
(last visited Sept. 1,2002).
64

71

Id.
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lation should be submitted to the Radio Technical Commission
of Aeronautics (RTCA) 7 2 Future Flight Data Collection Committee for consideration.""
The NTSB, however, contends that although generally beneficial,7 RTCA is an inappropriate forum for the Part 135 operators issue. In its May 8, 2000 letter to the FAA, the NTSB
emphasized that it considers the Part 135 issue a time-critical
one, and RTCA's ten to fifteen year projection period will not
support this immediacy. In any event, since all parties currently
await the RTCA report, the FAA has not yet proposed any regulation, expedited or not, requiring Part 135 operators to install
cockpit-view video recorders in their aircraft.

D.

PROPOSALS FOR PART

990

121

OPERATORS-THE EGYPT AIR
HEARINGS

The crash of Egypt Air Flight 9907' awoke the dormant cockpit view-video recorder debate with respect to transport category
airplanes operating under 14 C.F.R. § 121 ("Part 121"), a debate
resting fairly quietly since the USAir Flight 105 investigation.
According to information obtained from its cockpit voice recorder, Flight 990 First Officer El Batouty repeated the phrase "I
rely on God" eleven times in the final two minutes of the
doomed flight. 76 At the same time, it appears that the autopilot
was manually disconnected, the engines shut down, and the airplane nosed over into an extremely steep dive.7 7 Although the
NTSB has not officially determined the probable cause of the
72 According to its website, RTCA is a private, non-profit corporation that responds to requests from the FAA Administrator to "develop[ I consensus-based
recommendations regarding communications, navigation, surveillance, and air
traffic management . . . issues." RTCA is composed of "over 200 government,
industry and academic organizations" and its committees are staffed by volunteers. The NTSB and FAAjointly sponsor the Future Flight Data Collection Committee. See http://www.rtca.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
73 FAA Response, supra note 70.
74 In fact, NTSB Chairman Hall co-signed the letter authorizing RTCA to research the use of cockpit-view video cameras. See Hall Testimony, supra note 45.
75 Egypt Air Flight 990, a Boeing 767-332ER en route from New York City to
Cairo, crashed during the early morning hours on October 31, 1999, near Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. All persons on board were killed. See Public
Docket, Egypt Air 990, NTSB, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/EA990/
default.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
76 NTSB, Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation, Part 12 (Cockpit Voice Recorder), prepared by Albert G. Reitan, 35-38, Feb. 10, 2000.
77 Public Docket, supra note 75.
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crash,7 many in the aviation community have interpreted the
data as consistent with a successful suicide attempt by First Officer El Batouty.79
Approximately five months after the Egypt Air 990 crash, the
U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Infrastructure
and Transportation's Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing
on issues arising out of Egypt Air 990, including the implementation of cockpit video recorders."' Building on its Part 135 recommendation of two months prior, the NTSB acknowledged a
lack of conclusive evidence supporting pilot suicide, but nonetheless used the opportunity to "build support for cockpit video
recorders."'
As is now its habit, the NTSB once again attempted to establish a series of accident investigations demonstrating the need
for cockpit-view video recorders. This time, however, NTSB
Chairman James Hall cited not only the crash of Egypt Air 990,
but also Swissair Flight 11182 as well as the now infamous Valujet
Flight 592.83 According to Chairman Hall, had a cockpit-view
video camera been installed on ValuJet 592, it might have "provided critical information about the exact smoke and fire conditions present in the cockpit during the last few minutes of the
flight. '8 4

With respect

to Egypt Air 990, Chairman Hall

surmised that the NTSB "believes that electronic cockpit imagery would help resolve issues surrounding the flight crew's actions in the cockpit that resulted in the changes in the aircraft's
controls as well as the circumstances that prompted those
actions. "85
78 The NTSB has ruled out mechanical failure and weather-related causes. Id.
79 Despite the NTSB's findings, Egyptian experts have concluded that mechan-

ical failure, and not pilot suicide, caused the crash of Egypt Air 990. See Public
Docket, supra note 75.
80 U.S. House of Representatives Comm. Rep., supra note 74.
81 Paul Mann, Lawmakers Skeptical About Cockpit Video, Psych Tests, AVIATION WK.

& SPACE TECH., Apr. 17, 2000, availableat http://www.aviationnow.com.
82 According to the NTSB preliminary accident report, Swissair Flight 111, a
MD-11, crashed off the coast of Nova Scotia on September 2, 1998, killing all 231
aboard. See NTSB Identification: DCA98RA085, Sept. 2, 1998, availableat http://
www.intsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?evid=20001211 xli037&key=l.
8"Valujet Flight 592 crashed in the Florida Everglades on May 11, 1996. After
departing Miami, improperly carried oxygen generators caused a fire in the
cargo area, impairing the flight crew and killing all aboard. See NTSB, Aircraft
Accident Report AAR-97/06, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/1997/
aar9706.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
84 Hall Testimony, supra note 45.
85 Id.
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Secondly, the NTSB advanced its "glass cockpit" argument to
keep pace with the technological improvements of flight deck
avionics: the installation of controller-pilot data link (CPDL)
communications. The Board believes that as the possibility (and
probability) of non-voice data-link communications increases
between airplanes and air traffic control, the ability of the present-day cockpit voice and flight data recorders to monitor and
record those transmissions will be limited. For that reason,
Chairman Hall testified that "the video recording of the cockpit
CPDL display would be an acceptable and cost effective
means" 8" of recording that data for post-crash investigators.
E.

AFTER EGYPT AIR-THE CRUSADE CONTINUES

Any doubt concerning the importance of cockpit video monitoring to the NTSB has been dispelled in recent months. In a
series of speeches and presentations during the final months of
2000, NTSB Chairman Hall repeatedly campaigned for
mandatory installation of cockpit-view video recorders. For example, in remarks to the ICAO Air Navigation Committee in
November 2000, Chairman Hall commended the committee's
support for modernizing flight data recorders, including cockpit-view video recorders.8 7 As Chairman Hall recognized, "I
have spoken out at every opportunity about the need for video
recorders in the cockpits of our commercial aircraft. I hope
that you will continue to work toward that goal. Video recordings
are not a luxury-they are a necessity .. ."88 Eight days later, Chairman Hall also shared the NTSB belief that "cockpit image re9
corders are the next natural step in on-board recorders"8 with
the Global Airline Industry Program. After once again arguing
that technological advancements make cockpit video monitoring feasible as well as necessary, Chairman Hall summarized the
NTSB position as follows: "The idea is not to replace the CVR or
FDR, or duplicate information already recorded, but to capture
information that is not already recorded. That would enable us
to more easily determine causes of accidents and implement solutions to improve safety."9"
86 Id.

NTSB Chairman Jim Hall, Address to the ICAO Air Navigation Commission
(Nov. 21, 2000), available at http://wvw.ntsb.gov/speeches/jhc00112l.htm.
88 Id. (emphasis added).
87

89 Hall Remarks, supra note 8.
90 Id.
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V. THE RESPONSE TO COCKPIT VIDEO MONITORING
A.

THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Thus far, the FAA has not required the installation of cockpitview video recorders in either Part 121 or Part 135 aircraft. Instead, the FAA has decided to await the results of increased research that it hopes will produce reasonable technical standards.
FAA Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification,
Mr. Thomas McSweeny, summarizes the FAA position as: "At the
present time, the FAA does not mandate the use of video recordings in the cockpit of any aircraft. However, we have taken
steps to initiate a discussion within the aviation industry on a
future role for video technology in flight data collection."'"
As it did in response to the NTSB Part 135 recommendation,
the FAA has submitted the Part 121 cockpit video monitoring
issue to the RTCA - for consideration.9" The FAA has asked the
Future Flight Data Collection Committee of RTCA to "explore
and develop future concepts for flight data collection technologies for use in both accident investigation and accident and incident prevention." 4 According to Mr. McSweeny, the FAA
believes that "the use of the RTCA is a proper forum for the
discussion of these issues"' ' and has requested RTCA produce a
report that "reflects a ten- to fifteen-year look-ahead at anticipated data collection needs and technologies that leverage new
and emerging technology."96 The FAA, NTSB, and the industry
at large await the RTCA reports.
B.

THE AIRLINES' RESPONSE

While airlines generally concede that in the future video recorders probably will aid accident investigation, the current industry response to cockpit video monitoring has been less than
enthusiastic. Representing the airlines before the Senate Subcommittee, the Air Transport Association of America,97 con91 Issues Arising Out of the Egypt Air Crash, 106th Cong. 85 (2000) (statement of
FAA Associate Administrator Thomas McSweeny) [hereinafter McSweeny
Testimony].
92 See supra note 72.
93 McSweeny Testimony, supra note 91.
Id.
95 Id.
94

96

[d.

97 The Air Transportation Association of America (ATA) represents the major

U.S. passenger and cargo air carriers. According to ATA, ATA members "transport approximately 95% of the passengers and goods transported by air on U.S.
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ceded that "at some point cockpit video recorders will perhaps
be the norm" but cautioned that "we are not yet ready to use
them properly."9 8 On one hand, ATA appreciates the potential
benefits of video technology, and points out that as video technology has overcome potential problems (such as adapting to
the dynamic lighting conditions of an airplane cockpit - simulated or real), many airlines have begun to incorporate "video
cameras in flight simulators to record . . . training sessions.""
On the other hand, however, ATA raises two principal objections to current proposals for mandatory cockpit-view video recorders. First, ATA makes a temporal argument, cautioning that
cockpit video monitoring remains a tool of accident investigation 10 ° and not prevention. Consequently, cockpit video recorders do not save lives but rather posthumously examine the
causes of death. However important accident investigation is to
air safety, ATA nonetheless argues that the industry should concentrate on developing proactiveprograms designed to minimize
the chance of the crash, rather than reactive programs designed
to examine the causes of the crash. Only preventative measures,
according to ATA, maximize the industry's return on safety. "If
we had but one dollar to spend on safety, it would be spent of
[sic] prevention not investigation and it would be a dollar well
spent."1 01
Second, before ATA lends its support to mandatory cockpitview video recorders, it requires increased statutory protection
for the information recorded and preserved by the cameras.
Such protection is needed, according to ATA, because of the
"unfortunate history of abuse"'112 of airborne recorder information by unintended non-aviation, information recipients, such as
the recent television broadcast of portions of the audio tape capflag airlines." Issues Arising Out of the Egypt Air Crash, 106th Cong. 85 (2000) (statement of ATA Senior Vice President for Aviation Safety and Operations Robert H.
Frenzel) [hereinafter Frenzel Testimony].
98 Frenzel Testimony, supra note 97.
99 Id. In contrast to cockpit video monitoring, however, the video tape is
promptly erased after a post-training debriefing. Id.
100 Note that ATA rejects the NTSB's contention that cockpit-view video cameras will provide invaluable but otherwise unattainable information to accident
investigators. According to ATA, "We would acknowledge that a video recording
of the Egypt Air accident, and possibly the Swiss Air accident, would be helpful to
investigators .... It's a stretch however to assume that a camera aimed and focused on the instrument panel is going to provide the golden nugget that solves
the mystery. And yet, some believe that to be the case." Id.
101Frenzel Testimony, supra note 97.
102 Id.
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tured by the cockpit voice recorder from American Airlines
Flight 965.'' ATA reminded Congress that the "use of the recording should be limited to the events surrounding the investigation and not to enhance TV ratings."' 4 ATA posits that if the
media recognizes the entertainment value of voice recordings, its
ambition to obtain video recordings would be overwhelming.
Unfortunately this ambition provides little, if any, benefit to air
safety and therefore is unacceptable to ATA.
C.

THE LOUDEST AND MOST EMPHATIC RESPONSE: THE
PILOT UNIONS

The most vehement objection to mandatory cockpit-view
video recorders comes from pilot unions, such as the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Coalition of Airline Pilots Association (CAPA). °5 Testifying during the Egypt Air 990 hearings, both pilot organizations rejected any proposal for
mandatory cockpit video monitoring, concluding that however
well-intentioned, cockpit-view video recorders are a misguided
attempt to increase air safety." 6
First, both unions join ATA in arguing for enhanced proactive,
rather than reactive safety initiatives. Citing recent initiatives
such as the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (the "Gore Commission") and the National Civil Aviation Review Commission, ALPA President Woerth argued that:
The current industry thrust, and rightly so, is towards a proactive
approach (incident identification & analysis), instead of traditional reactive approach (accident investigation). In other
103 American Airlines Flight 965, a Boeing 757, collided with terrain while on
descent into Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, killing 160 persons. See NTSB
Identification: DCA96RA020, Dec. 20, 1995, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/
NTSB/brief.asp?evid=20001207x4990&key=1.
114 Frenzel Testimony, supra note 97.
105 According to its website, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) represents
over 67,000 pilots flying for 51 different airlines in the United States and Canada.
See http://www.alpa.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2002.) Members include pilots at
Delta Air Lines, United Airlines and Northwest Airlines. The Coalition of Airline Pilots Association (CAPA) forms a consortium of member organizations to
increase bargaining and lobbying power. See http://vww.capapilots.org (last visited Sept.1, 2002). Id. Its members make tip the flight crews at airlines such as
American Airlines, FedEx, United Parcel Service and Southwest Airlines. See
http://www.capapilots.org (last visited Sept.1, 2002).
lO;See Issues Arising Out of the Egypt Air Crash, 106th Cong. 85 (2000) (statement
of Captain Duane Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots Association [hereinafter Woerth Testimony] and statement of Captain Robert Miller, Chairman, Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations [hereinafter Miller Testimony]).

2002]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION SAFETY

517

words, provide the air transportation industry with the tools to
detect & remedy the unsafe and undesirable trends that will
eventually result in accidents, and thereby prevent the7 next accident without having to wait for the 'smoking hole.'"1
CAPA echoed Captain Woerth's sentiments, arguing that the
FAA should "mandate equipage of aircraft with systems and de-

vices that enhance safety-that help prevent accidents or save lives
and reduce injuries in the event of an accident.""1 8 CAPA further
argued that given the current backlog of proactive safety initiatives currently before the FAA, the agency should act on those
initiatives before considering any new, reactive safety measures.
In sum, the "strained regulatory resources should be devoted to
completing [the] rulemakings that will save lives before even
considering the video camera question."'

Second, both organizations reject the notion that even as a
reactive tool, cockpit-view video recorders enhance aviation
safety. In fact, ALPA unambiguously discards the notion that

"video monitoring ...of flight deck crews will make any contri-

bution at all toward increas[ing] air safety."'"" For support,
ALPA relies on the 1999 conclusion of the International Civil
Aviation Organization's Accident Investigation Group (ICAO
AIG) that cockpit video cameras were not "technically warranted.""' CAPA goes even further, rejecting the cockpit-view
video camera not only as a potential benefit to safety but even as
a benefit to accident investigators. According to Chairman
Miller, CAPA does not "believe [cockpit-view video cameras]
would provide additional information that would be sufficient to
make a probable cause determination for accidents whose cause
could not otherwise be determined."'" 2 Instead, CAPA argues
that since modern flight data recorders are now able to record
an enormous number of parameters, the FDR provides the acci107

108

Woerth Testimony, supra note 106.
Miller Testimony, supra note 106.

1- Id.

HO Woerth Testimony, supra note 106.
"'I

Id.

Miller Testimony, supra note 106. CAPA makes two principal arguments to
refute the utility of cockpit video monitoring, each one using the same accidents
cited by the NTSB. Id. First, CAPA reminds the NTSB that a video camera will
display little in a smoke-filled cockpit, such as in ValuJet 592. Id. Second, CAPA
questions how a cockpit video recorder will solve the problems associated with
electrical power outages. Id. "For power outages, the way to solve the problem
would be to ensure a back-up power source for the existing recording devices,
not to require new recording devices subject to the same problems." Id.
112
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dent investigator with the same information as a cockpit-view
video camera, just in a different form.
Given those conclusions, it is not surprising that pilot organizations attack proposed cockpit monitoring as an unwarranted,
potentially "egregious invasion of privacy."'"1 3 According to
ALPA, a balance must be struck "between a flight crew's individual right to privacy and the collective benefits for aviation
safety."" 4 And cockpit-view video recorders, by providing little
(or no) potential benefit to air safety, therefore necessarily impede upon a flight crew's right of privacy. Like ATA, however,
pilots appear to define privacy in terms of data protection, particularly from media broadcasts as well as using video data to aid
the potential criminal prosecution of pilots.
First, pilots argue that unless protected, cockpit video recordings could provide the media with a top story to satisfy its "viewers' voyeuristic appetite.""' 5 Unfortunately for Ted Koppel,
pilots argue that national broadcasts fail to enhance air safety.
As CAPA Chairman Miller stated:
What we fear is that, however well-intentioned the NTSB may be
in making its proposal, cockpit videos will wind up on the evening news.., or on the internet, with millions of viewers gawking
at pilots in the cockpit struggling to control
an aircraft under the
11 6
most difficult conditions imaginable.
Both organizations rely on their collective experience with
current cockpit voice recorders (CVR) as support for measures
designed to prevent the "release of the imagery for inappropriate purposes""' 7 Like ATA, pilots contend that the recent national television broadcast of the CVR from doomed American
Airlines Flight 965,' '" described by Captain Woerth as "an outrage to many pilots in this country,""' demonstrates the need
for statutory protection. Because of incidents such as American
965, ALPA has concluded that the "public, and that includes
most of the media, has neither the background knowledge, the
analytical skills, nor the incentives to help us much with the
Woerth testimony, supra note 106.
Lindsay Fenwick, Security of Recorded Information, InternationalSymposium on
Transportation Recorders, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/symp-rec/proceedings/authors/Fenwick.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
115 Miller Testimony, supra note 106.
113

114

116

Id.

117 Woerth Testimony, supra note 106.

118 See supra note 103.
H9 Woerth Testimony, supra note 106.
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painstaking, complex, and often frustrating task of furthering
aviation safety."''2 And given that pictures are worth more than
a thousand words, pilots have "no confidence that we can completely prevent video abuses and inappropriate releases." 121
Second, pilots raise concerns about the use of video recordings to aid post-accident litigation, including the criminal prosecution of pilots. While neither group contends that airline
flight crews should receive immunity from prosecution1 22 or be
"held blameless when they make mistakes, ' 1 2 3 both ALPA and
CAPA argue that recorded data has been used "improperly and
unwisely, to aid the prosecution. ' 12 4 As CAPA noted, "one of the
strongest proponents of video recorders at NTSB's symposium
was a plaintiffs lawyer who said, in essence, that 'video cameras

will make it easier to make my case.'

"125

Although the criminal prosecution of pilots remains extremely rare in the United States, pilots argue that the possibility
is not totally impossible, particularly given the recent trend towards criminalizing aviation accidents. The most infamous recent example of a post-crash criminal investigation involves
Valujet Flight 592, which crashed after departing Miami, Florida, killing all aboard.' 26 The NTSB concluded that improperly
loaded oxygen generators had exploded in the cargo hold, igniting a fire that consumed the aircraft and debilitated the flight
crew. 1 27 In July 1999, the United States Attorney's Office filed a
twenty-four count indictment against those responsible for loading the generators, primarily for falsifying records 2 and violating hazardous materials regulations. 29 And although the U.S.
Attorney's office did not prosecute the flight crew operating
Valujet 592, ALPA supports its argument by citing at least one
Fenwick, supra note 114.
Worth Testimony, supra note 106.
"Most airline labor agreements indemnify pilots from financial liability."
See Fenwick, supra note 114.
120

121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.

Miller testimony, supra note 106.
For an excellent analysis of the growing trend of criminal enforcement of
aviation-related misconduct, see Martin R. Raskin, CriminalEnforcement in the Aviation Industry, The NTSB Transportation Safety and the Law Symposium, available
at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2000/symp-legal/Raskin%20paper.htm (1999).
See also supra note 83.
125
126

127

Id.

Many of the charges for falsifying documents had nothing to do with the
Valujet accident. Id.
129Id.
128
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instance, following a USAir' 3" flight that slid off the runway at
New York's LaGuardia Airport,' 3 ' in which the "District Attorney, for a time intended, to prosecute the flight crew."'1 2 Thus,
although no District Attorney has yet decided to indict a flight
crew, pilots nonetheless do not want to add fuel to the fire by
providing prosecutors with video evidence.
Furthermore, pilots argue that outside the United States there
exists an even stronger trend towards criminalizing aviation accidents, including prosecuting flight crews. For instance, ALPA
maintains that it has witnessed a growing trend among "numerous European, African and Asian countries . . . of criminally

prosecuting pilots, and recorded data has been used to aid the
prosecution.""':

Specifically, ALPA cites a recent case from New

Zealand, in which the court held that the international standards set forth in ICAO Annex 13134 did not bind New Zealand
courts and consequently provided police with access to the CVR
audio tape as part of the criminal investigation. 3 '
D.

THE LIMITS OF STATUTORY PROTECTION

Pilots appreciate, however, that aircraft mobility poses a significant problem to any proposed and Congressionally adopted
statutory protections of recorded data. As exemplified by the
American Airlines Flight 965 incident in Cali, Colombia, any
data retrieved from a U.S. registered aircraft that crashes
outside the United States is protected only to the extent of the
local law. In the case of Flight 965, the "release and subsequent
airing of [the CVR audio tape] was not a violation of any Colombian... law."'" Because of American 965 as well as other experiences with cockpit voice recorders, pilots consequently worry
134)Now

known as US Airways.
National Transportation Safety Board, Accident Report AAR-90-03, USAir,
Inc., Boeing 737-400 LaGuardia Airport Flushing, New York, September 20, 1989,
adopted July 3, 1990.
132 Fenwick, supra note 114.
13,

133

1d.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the international
aviation arm of the United Nations. Almost all modern nations are signatories to
its conventions, including the United States and New Zealand. As part of its role,
ICAO promulgates standards, including those for accident investigation, which
are found in Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention.
135 See New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Assn. v. Attorney-General, [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R.
269.
I- Woerth Testimony, supra note 106.
134
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that "[b]eyond our shores, the sanctity of the CVR (and by extension, cockpit video recordings) ' 13 7 remains in doubt.
Pilots should take solace, though, in the fact that international regulatory bodies also recognize the problems associated
with domestically legislating data protection. In 1999, the International Civil Aviation Organization's Accident Investigation
Group (ICAO AIG 99) sought to modernize the international
standards for protecting sensitive, post crash safety data. In particular, the AIG sought to strengthen the protective language of
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, which provides those international standards. 8 Unfortunately, the AIG could not arrive at a satisfactory consensus, and candidly doubted its
authority to set international standards designed to displace
each member country's domestic legislation. 3 9
Jurisdictional issues not withstanding, even if ICAO successfully promulgates international standards, compliance with
those standards is far from guaranteed. As ALPA President
Woerth notes, not all nations are ICAO signatories, and even if
they are, any country can opt out of an ICAO international standard by filing a Notification of Difference. 4 ' Thus, nations can
easily disregard ICAO standards of data protection, thereby
opening up the door to misappropriation. Whatever the shortcomings, however, pilots nonetheless argue that while stronger
statutory protection should begin at the domestic level, protective ICAO standards are needed to complete the circle of domestic and international data protection.
E.

NEW LEGISLATION

Despite potential gaps in international regulation, the United
States has arguably taken the first step to introducing cockpit
video monitoring. In April 2000, Senator John McCain (Rep.,
Ariz.) introduced the National Transportation Safety Board
Amendments Act of 2000 to the Senate Floor.' 4 ' Although the
Id.
See, e.g., Caj Frostell, discussing possible language changes and amendments to Chapter 5.12 of Annex 13 to be proposed at the 1999 meeting, , Statement on International Symposium on Transportation Records (May 4, 1999)
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/symp-rec/proceedings/May_4/SessionIII/Frostell_transcript.htm. ICAO standards are commonly called SARPs, or
"Standards and Recommended Practices."
139 Woerth Testimony, supra note 106.
144) Id.
141 See 146 CONG. REC. S2617 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 2000), at 52628.
137

138
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bill primarily reauthorized federal funding for the NTSB, the
bill also included language "requested by the Safety Board to
require the withholding from public disclosure of voice and
video recorder information for all modes of transportation comparable to the protections already statutorily provided for cockpit voice recorders."'' 42 Senator McCain found that this
language provided "an important step in ensuring that ...

re-

protected from unwarranted disclosure or
corders are properly
143
alternative use.'

On November 1, 2000, President Clinton signed the NTSB
Reauthorization legislation into law. Consequently, the language requested by Senator McCain, airlines, and pilots now
statutorily protects both voice and video recorders from inappro1 44
priate use, including discovery in civil or criminal litigation.
Thus, perhaps the first step to introducing cockpit-view video
recorders is now behind us.
VI.

PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS-AN INTRODUCTION
A.

BACKGROUND

As discussed in the preceding section of this Comment, one of
the principal objections to cockpit video monitoring comes
from its ability to function only as a reactive, rather than a proactive safety measure. In essence, groups such as ALPA and ATA
contend that since cockpit video monitoring becomes useful
only after the airplane has crashed, it does little to save lives.
And, while these groups concede that accident investigation
does play some role in improving air safety, these groups instead
advocate proactive safety programs that strive to prevent the accident from happening at all.
To that end, the aviation industry is developing safety programs designed to facilitate the collection, analysis and dissemination of voluntarily submitted safety data. Analyzing this data
hopefully will enable safety officials to discern and correct any
trends, conditions and/or procedures that might adversely impact air safety long before lives are lost. The two most prominent examples are the Airline Safety Action Program (ASAP)
142 Id. at 99 (emphasis added). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) and 49 U.S.C.
§ 1154(b).
143 146 CONG. REC. S2617 at 52628.
144 See Pub. L. No. 106-424, 114 Stat. 1883 (Nov. 1, 2000), amending 49 U.S.C.
§ 1114(c) to include "cockpit voice or video recorder" and 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) to
define 'recorder' as including "voice or video recorder." (emphasis added).
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and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program.
ASAP, originally developed as a joint program between American Airlines and the Allied Pilots Association,' 45 encourages
American Airlines employees to voluntarily submit safety data by
providing immunity for any admitted regulatory violations so
long as no criminal activity, intentional acts, or substance abuse
is involved.14 6 FOQA is similar to ASAP, but collects data from
the airplanes themselves using a variety of on-board recorders
such as Digital Flight Data Recorders (DFDR) and Quick-Access
Recorders (QAR)."' The airline then scrutinizes the data to
predict potential problems and therefore refine airplane and
flight crew performance and training. In sum, airlines hope
that ASAP and FOQA will allow them to proactively correct
problems before a fatal accident occurs to "see it before you see
it on CNN."' 48
B.

THE CVR OF DATA COLLECTION-THE AVIATION SAFETY
REPORTING SYSTEM

Although the programs examined by this Comment are recent in scope, the aviation industry has emphasized immunized
safety and operational data collection for over twenty-five years.
In 1975, the FAA instituted the Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) "I9and designated the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)'

51

to oversee its implementation and

5'

management.'
The goal of ASRS is to provide a "cooperative
safety reporting program [that] invites pilots, controllers, flight
attendants, maintenance personnel, and other users of the National Airspace System (NAS) . . . to report to NASA actual or
potential discrepancies and deficiencies involving the safety of
The Allied Pilots Association, or A.P.A., represents the pilots of American
Airlines. See http://www.alliedpilots.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
146 See FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 120-66(A) (2000)
[hereinafter A.C. No. 120-66A].
147 See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 4910-13-M, Flight Operational Quality
Assurance Program, July 5, 2000, available at http://www.asy.faa.gov/gain/
FOQA_& ASAP/FOQANPRM/NPRMFOQA.pdf [hereinafter FOQA NPRM].
145

148

Brandt, supra note 3.

For more information (including representative examples of submitted
ASRS reports as well as access to ASRS publications such as Callback), please see
the ASRS homepage at http://www.asrs.arc.nasa.gov (last visited Jan. 13, 2001).
150 Because of NASA oversight, pilots commonly refer to ASRS reports as
"NASA reports."
151 See FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP. ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 00-46D (1987),
availableat http://www.asrs.arc.nasa.gov/immunity.htm [hereinafter A.C. No. 0046D].
149

524

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN

COMMERCE

aviation operations."' 152 It is hoped that ASRS information permits the FAA to "take corrective action... to remedy the defects
5 3
or deficiencies in the [National Airspace System.]'

Recognizing that the program's success largely depends on
the "free, unrestricted flow of information,"'

5

ASRS provides

regulatory incentives to encourage voluntary submission. First,
any information identifying either the submitting party or an155
other party named in an ASRS report will be de-identified.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the FAA imposed regulatory limitations on using submitted reports in enforcement actions against industry certificate holders, such as pilots.
Specifically, 14 C.F.R. § 91.25, entitled "Aviation Safety Reporting Program: Prohibition against the use of reports for enforcement purposes," states: "The Administrator of the FAA will not
use reports submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration under the Aviation Safety Reporting Program
(or information derived therefrom) in any enforcement action
except information concerning accidents or criminal
offenses
' 56
which are wholly excluded from the program.'
Therefore, federal regulations allow only two exceptions to
ASRS immunity - accidents and criminal investigations. The

FAA has added a third exception, however, that prohibits ASRS
immunity from deliberate actions.

57

Like its recent progeny, supporters argue that ASRS reports
provide valuable information to flight crews and airlines. To aid
the flow of information, NASA collects the ASRS reports and
disseminates them to industry groups, as well as publishes a
monthly magazine highlighting several of the previous month's
submissions. 158

152 Id. For example, 3,292 ASRS reports were submitted in November 2000,
with 2,388 coming from airline pilots. See the January 2001 edition of Callback,
available at http://www.asrs.arc.nasa.gov/callbackissues/cb_257.htm.

153 A.C. No. 00-46D, supra note 151.

Id. at para. 1.
See id. at para. 8.
1% 14 C.F.R. § 91.25 (2000).
'57 See A.C. No. 00-46D, supra note 151, at para. 9(c)(1).
Note that paragraph
nine does not apply to air traffic controllers. Instead, FAA Order 7210.3 governs
ATC personnel.
158 See the Callback website for more information, at http://www.asrs.arc.nasa.
gov/callback.htm.
155
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THE AIRLINE SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM (ASAP)
A.

DESCRIPTION

Building on the ASRS program, in 1994 American Airlines
and the Allied Pilots Association (in conjunction with the FAA)
created the American Airlines Safety Action Partnership
(ASAP). 59 According to Capt. K. Scott Griffith,1 6 ° ASAP electronically collects and analyzes information voluntarily submitted by individual American Airlines employees.1"6 ' And like
ASRS, ASAP is designed to provide "non-punitive" corrective action to prevent accidents and incidents, as well as measure overall system performance 62 In a recent affidavit, Captain Griffith
described how American Airlines analyzes and utilizes ASAP
data:
Upon submission, the de-identified reports are reviewed on a
weekly basis by a joint committee comprised of representatives
from American, FAA and APA who in turn issue pilot advisories,
procedure changes and individual skill enhancement recommendations, with an eye toward evaluating changes in flight and
training procedures and implement[ing] other corrections that
may prevent further incidents. 6 3
To encourage American Airlines employees to file ASAP reports, ASAP reports are entitled to the same immunities as an
ASRS report as well as similar administrative solutions (rather
than certificate actions).' 6 4
Support for ASAP among American's flight personnel seems
strong. As of November 1998, over 17,000 reports had been submitted under ASAP.' 6 5 For example, one American Airlines pilot related his recent use of the ASAP program:
We read back, "descend and maintain FL230 [23,000 feet]. "I
heard the controller say it and heard the F.O. [First Officer] read
it back. Out of FL290 [29,000 feet] the controller said, "Ameri15,9
Slides from Griffith, Captain K. Scott, American Airlines Safety Action Partner-

ship (ASAP), Nov. 3, 1998, at http://www.gainweb.org [hereinafter Griffith
Slides].
160Captain Griffith is the American Airlines Managing Director of Flight Operations Safety as well as the original architect of the ASAP program.
161Griffith slides, supra note 159.
162 Id.

16'In reAir Crash Near Cali, Colum. on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F. Supp. 1529, 1531
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing the affidavit of Scott Griffith), affd and vacated on other
grounds, Cortes v. Am. Airlines, 177 F.3d 1272 (lth Cir. 1999).
16"

Id.

165Griffith Slides, supra note 159.
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can XXX, what is your altitude?" We replied, "Out of 290 for
FL230." The controller said, "Stop at FL290." We responded,
"Roger, leveling at FL290." The controller then commanded,
"American XXX, turn left to 230." At the time, there was a similar call sign military jet that we could not hear because it was on
U.H.F. Because I knew what we heard and what we'd read back,
I sent in an ASAP." 6
Furthermore, though ASAP initially applied only to American
Airlines flight crews, the program has been subsequently expanded to include the dispatch and maintenance departments
as well.' 7

B.

THE

FAA's

VIEW OF

ASAP

Support for ASAP is not limited to American Airlines employees. In March 2000, the FAA demonstrated its support for ASAP
by issuing Advisory Circular No. 120-66A, which provides all airlines with the regulatory requirements for obtaining agency approval of ASAP programs. 1 In particular, the FAA reveals its
support for ASAP by affirming the potential benefits of ASAP
and, more importantly, outlining the regulatory protections for
submitting parties. According to the FAA, ASAP benefits air
safety by encouraging "voluntary reporting of safety issues and
.events that come to the attention of employees of certain certificate holders.""' And just as the original ASAP program provided immunity to most inadvertent violators, the FAA affords
industry professionals the ability to "identify and report safety
issues to management and the FAA for resolution generally
without fear the FAA will use those reports to take enforcement
action against them." 170
With much more detail, however, the Advisory Circular outlines the degree of protection afforded ASAP reports. In general, the FAA will refrain from using the content of an ASAP
report to "initiate or support any company disciplinary action,
or as evidence for any purpose in an FAA enforcement aco Email interview with Captain, American Airlines (Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Interview with American Airlines Captain]. To coincide with the immunities
afforded this pilot by ASAP, his identity and the flight number have been removed for purposes of this paper.
167Griffith Slides, supra note 159.
168 See A.C. No. 120-66A, supra note 146.
1 1I.
at para. 1.
17,)
Id. at para. 1(b).
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tion."' 17 1 The general policy notwithstanding, however, ASAP reports provide varying grounds of immunity from FAA
enforcement actions. First, ASAP provides no protection for intentionally unsafe activity, criminal activity, or activity those results from the use of controlled substances or substance
abuse. 172 In the alternative, ASAP provides total protection only
when the ASAP report is the only source of information for the
alleged violation. If independent evidence of the violation exists, an ASAP report limits the FAA to addressing any potential
violation with administrative action rather than through certificate action (such as revocation and/or suspension).' 7 3 Two typical forms of administrative action are warning notices and
letters of correction.1 74 Returning to the example above, the
American Airlines pilot received the following administrative
resolution to his ASAP submission:
Usually, [ASAP reports] are cleared up in about a week or two.
Mine didn't clear up for a month. I actually had an FAA [inspector] give me a [training] check from Orlando to DFW. Same leg
[as the incident], but later in the month. A real nice guy, he said
he was just giving a routine line check. He slipped up, however,
when I told him that I'd had a problem on this [radio] frequency
in the beginning of the month. He said "I know." He got all red
in the face, but there was a call on the radio and we started our
descent and he didn't elaborate. Pretty funny. The ASAP [report] was
cleared up the next day with no letter or anything in
75
my file. 1

C.

ASAP:

THE COURT'S PERSPECTIVE

Although most courts have not addressed ASAP program protections, at least one court recently adopted a protectionist attitude towards ASAP reports, holding that they should be entitled
to a "qualified privilege."' 7 6 In a pre-trial consolidation of over
one hundred and thirty lawsuits filed against American Airlines
in the aftermath of American Flight 965,' the court denied the
plaintiff steering committee's 'requests for discovery of docu171
172

Id. at para. 11(a).
Id. at para. 11(c).

173A.C. No. 120-66A, supra note 146, at para. 4(a).
174 Id.

Interview with American Airlines Captain, supra note 166.
In re Air Crash, Near Cali, Colum. 959 F. SLipp. at 1531. See also Frederick
P. Alimonti, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 64J. AIR L. & COM. 29, 45
(1998).
177 See supra note 103.
175

1763See
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ments prepared by American Airlines in conjunction with the
ASAP program. After rejecting American's first assertion that
the "self-critical analysis" privilege protected discovery of the
documents, the court determined that ASAP documents should
be entitled to a federal common law "qualified privilege," rebuttable only by a showing of substantial need and undue
hardship. 78
For support, the court applied four factors that the U.S. Supreme Court has required to recognize a new federal common
law privilege. 7 9 Following Jaffee, the district court first considered whether the privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust,"8' and found that the airline, the pilots,

and the FAA all had legitimate private interests in protecting the
ASAP materials."8 ' Second, the court concluded that the new
privilege would "serve public ends," 182 since there exists a "powerful and compelling" public interest in improving air safety.' 83
Third, the court considered whether the evidentiary detriment
caused by an exercise of the privilege is modest'84 and found
that since ASAP protects only inadvertent and/or incidental violations, any intentional or dangerous violation would remain discoverable.' 85 And lastly, since it was not aware of any similar
state privilege, the court concluded that denying a federal privilege would not frustrate a parallel privilege adopted by the
states."6 As a result, the court determined that American Airlines had met its burden of proving that the ASAP documents
were entitled to a qualified privilege."8 7
Although initially rejected in In re Air Crash, New Cali Columbia
a second federal court accepted American's "self-critical analysis" privilege argument. In an employment discrimination claim
brought by retired pilots challenging an airline policy that prevented them from assuming positions as Flight Engineers,' 8 the
In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colum., 959 F. Supp. at 1530.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). See also Sheldone v. Penn. Tpk.
Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 512 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
180 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9.
181 In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colum., 959 F. Supp. at 1534.
182 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
183 In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colum., 959 F. Supp. at 1534.
184 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13.
185 In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colum., 959 F. Supp. at 1535.
186 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13.
187 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(2000).
88 Federal regulations require an airline pilot to retire on her sixtieth birthday. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1978). However, many pilots remain in the cock178
179
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court held that "safety reports" prepared by American Airlines
should be entitled to 'self-critical analysis' privilege. 189 In Tice,
American Airlines satisfactorily established the four elements required to obtain the self-critical privilege. 190 In particular, the
court noted that "the flow of internal airline safety information
would be somewhat curtailed" if discovery of these documents
were allowed. 9 ' Consequently, the only courts to consider air-

line safety data prepared by programs such as ASAP have both
concluded that the data is entitled to at least a "qualified" privilege, if not a more protective one.

VIII.

FLIGHT OPERATIONS QUALITY
ASSURANCE (FOQA)

A second major data collection and sharing program currently in development is the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. Based largely upon a successful
program developed in the 1970s and operational at British Airways for more than ten years, 92 FOQA involves the routine collection and subsequent analysis of flight data generated by onboard recorders, such as the quick-access recorder (QAR)."'9
There is little doubt as to FOQA's potential benefits. Even the
FAA considers FOQA as "one of the most promising industry
initiatives with [a] realistic potential to reduce accidents." '9 4 Adpit by assuming the role of the Flight Engineer, which is not a "pilot" under the
regulations and therefore not subject to the "Age-60 rule."
189Tice v. Am. Airlines, 192 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Note that the court
does not identify the reports as part of the ASAP program. Nevertheless, this
decision will bear upon future litigation of sensitive airline safety documents.
190 Id. at 273. See also Morgan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 182 F.R.D. 261, 266 (N.D.
11. 1998) (articulating the four elements as (1) the information sought resulted
from a self-analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection, (2) the public
interest in obtaining that information is strong, (3) the flow of information
would be curtailed if discovery was allowed, and (4) the documents were prepared with the expectation of confidentiality).
19,Tice, 192 F.R.D. at 273.
192 For an outstanding summary and history of the British Airways program,
called B.A.S.I.S. (British Airways Safety Information System), see Capt. Thomas A.
Duke (ret.), A Long Standing, Successful Aviation Safety Reporting System, AIR LINE
PILor, Jan. 2001, at 8.
193 See FOQA NPRM, supra note 147.
194See FAA Notice, Policy on the Use of Enforcement Purposes of Information Obtained
from an Air CarrierFlight OperationalQuality Assurance (EQOQA) Program,63 Fed. Reg.
67505-01, 1998 WL 836387 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey Notice]. See also, Capt.
Mike Holtom, Properly managed FOQA programme represents an important safety toolfor
airlines, 55 ICAO, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 7 (heralding FOQA as "probably the most
important safety tool available to airlines today") [hereinafter Holtom].
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ditionally, in an FAA-sponsored study, the Flight Safety Foundation concluded that "FOQA must proceed in the United States"
and that its implementation would "have a more positive impact
on [commercial airlines operating under] Part 121 operational
included in the
safety than any other human factors program
' 95
FAA's research and development plans."'

Despite its promise, FOQA has languished as a demonstration
project, probably in large part due to the fierce battle raged by
airlines and pilots to protect the data retrieved through FOQA.
This section of the Comment examines the development of
FOQA in the United States and the current battles preventing
its full implementation.
A.

DEVELOPMENT AND SUCCESS

As noted above, European airlines have utilized data retention and analysis programs for decades.1 96 In contrast, the
United States did not formally propose a FOQA program until a
1995 Department of Transportation sponsored Aviation Safety
Conference, previously relying on agency enforcement as its
principal safety tool.' 9 7 Confronted with the projected growth
in commercial aviation traffic, it became clear that enforcement
alone would be "unlikely to achieve the further reductions in
the accident rate that are needed."' 9 The industry therefore
turned its attention to proactive, preventative safety measures
such as FOQA.
Proposed data retention and analysis programs like FOQA became popular for at least three reasons. First, and as noted
above, similar programs had achieved widespread success
throughout Europe. Second, FOQA fits neatly into the modern
technological and regulatory framework, since current regulations require airlines to install flight data recorders on airliners
and retain the data retrieved for at least sixty days after some
accidents or incidents. 199 Third, and perhaps most importantly,
195 General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: US Efforts to Implement Flight Operational Quality Assurance Programs, reprinted in FLIGHT SAFE-ry DIGEST, July-Sept.
1998, The FOQA Concept and Its Implementation in the United States, app. 1, at 22
[hereinafter GAO Study].
1% Brandt, supra note 3.
197 Id. See also Garvey Notice, supra note 194. One notable exception to enforcement emphasis would be ASRS.
191 Garvey Notice, supra note 194.
,9,1 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.343(a)-(d) (2001) and 14 C.F.R. § 125.225(a)-(d), (g)
(2001). See also Garvey Notice, supra note 194.
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technical advances in computer power, software, and digital avionics have made data retention and collection far easier and
more cost effective. 200 The Boeing 777, for example, continuously processes approximately 60,000 parameters, of which
2,000 are recorded by British Airways.20 1
FOQA became a reality when the FAA initiated a three-year
demonstration project to investigate the costs and benefits of a
FOQA program. 202 Three airlines originally partnered with the
FAA in the demonstration (United Airlines, US Airways, and
Continental Airlines) and a fourth joined three years later
(Alaska Airlines.). 20 3 From the FAA, partner airlines received
much of the software and equipment, including quick-access recorders.20 4 Other airlines (such as Delta, Northwest, Southwest
and Trans World Airlines) though not full partners and thus not
actively participating in the demonstration project, attentively
monitored its progress.20 5
The FOQA demonstration received high praise as participating airlines reported significant safety benefits. For example,
Continental Airlines now captures over 1,000 parameters per
second from its "Next Generation" Boeing 737s 206 and has used
the data to review and identify possible causes for unstabilized
approaches2 0'7 at certain airports and runways. 20 1 Using that information, Continental assembled a "top-10 list of airports
where FOQA data showed unstabilized approaches," and disseminated that information to its flight crews through recurrent
training, notations on navigational publications and articles in
flight crew magazines. 2 9 As a result, "in just one year, the air200
201
202

See Holtom, supra note 194.
Id.
GAO Study, supra note 195, at 2.

204

Id. at 25 (Appendix I).
Id. at 24.

205

Id.

203

Continental Airlines extensively flies several "Next Generation" Boeing 737
models, including the -700 and -800 series airplanes. For more information, see
Continental's website at http://www.flycontinental.com (last visited Jan. 13,
2001).
207 According to Continental FOQA Manager (and First Officer) Al Baldwin,
FOQA computers note when an airplane approaches the airport with an excessive rate of descent, such as greater than 1,000 feet per minute when less than
500 feet above ground. See GAO Study, supra note 195, at 28 (entitled "Airlines
Report Benefits from FAA FOQA Demonstration Project.").
208 Id.
209 Id.
206
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port where the most unstabilized approaches
had occurred now
21°
has dropped off our top-10 list.

Continental flight crews share in the high praise for FOQA.
For example, one Continental Airlines pilot described FOQA as
"the most impressive thing we have here. I use it all the time on
the line. I especially like the FOQA headsup when the other guy
will be flying the approach. I keep a closer eye on him at some
places.

' 21 1

Furthermore, in making its case against cockpit video

monitoring, the Coalition of Airline Pilots2 12 (CAPA) vigorously
argued that the industry should concentrate on proactive safety
measures, including FOQA. 2 3 Testifying before the Aviation
subcommittee, CAPA President stated: "We are aware of the
FOQA program pioneered by United Airlines that uses flight
data recorder readouts to discern operational trends and focus
on correction of problems before they result in accidents. Such
a pro-active program focused on accident prevention is very
'
helpful."214
United Airlines, the first and largest demonstration partner, 21 5 also has successfully employed FOQA. United Airlines
believes FOQA can improve its total system performance by enabling the airline to monitor the "full flight" (i.e., flight crew,
2
aircraft and air traffic control) instead of isolated incidents.

II

For instance, United uses FOQA data to monitor "taxiing speed
or taxiway roughness," thereby informing air traffic control
when taxiways need repaving. 2 7 Moreover, United has used
F.O.Q.A data to investigate and create new approach procedures into Monterey, California and New York's LaGuardia
218
Airport.
Id.
Email interview with Jeff Ragusa, First Officer, Continental Airlines (Jan. 16,
2001) (email correspondence on file with author).
212 One member of the CAPA coalition is the Independent Association of Continental Pilots, which represents the interests of Continental Airlines flight crews.
See supra note 105.
21. Miller Testimony, su/nra note 106.
2101
21,

214

ld.

By 2000, United planned to have over 200 aircraft equipped with quick
access recorders, including Boeing 737-500s, Boeing 777s, its Airbus A320 series
aircraft, and all new aircraft currently on order. SeeGAO Study, supra note 195, at
29.
216 Comments of Captain Jeff Bayless, manager of FOQA at United Airlines,
reprinted in GAO Study, supra note 195, at 29.
217 Id.
218 Id.
215
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Lastly, even the FAA praises FOQA as a safety tool. In a recent
article, FAA Associate Administrator for System Safety, Christopher A. Hart, stated that "We're already seeing the effects from
individual activities at [U.S. and foreign] airlines in terms of improving their safety margins, and as these experiences are
shared I think it will increase safety margins worldwide. 211
Whether recognizing potential safety benefits translates into regulatory support, however, is the topic of the next section.
B.

CURRENT ISSUES FACING

FOQA

Given the resounding air safety benefits articulated by participating airlines,22° it seems strange that FOQA has not been im-

plemented by non-participating airlines. There must be some
impediment preventing the full-scale rollout of FOQA programs. With little doubt, that impediment (as it has been for
each safety initiative examined in this Comment) is the required
level of protection for FOQA data. In fact, a 1993 Flight Safety
Foundation study of FOQA identified "protection of data from
use for other than safety and operational-improvement purposes" as the single greatest obstacle facing FOQA. 22 1 A blow-by-

blow history of the battle for FOQA data protection follows.
Statutory and Regulatory Protection
22
As part of the 1996 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, 2
Congress added 49 U.S.C. § 40123 to limit the ability of federal
agencies to disclose "voluntarily-provided safety or security related information. '"223 According to the legislation, voluntarilysubmitted safety information should remain undisclosed if the
FAA determines the information conforms to the requirements
of the statute. Principally, information should not be disclosed
if the FAA determines that the information contributes to the
FAA's safety and security responsibilities, withholding the infor1.

Edward H. Phillips, Uninhibited Data Sharing Called Key to Improving Airline
WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 23, 2000, available at http://
www.gainweb.org/GAIN-Information/avweekarticleoct00.html.
220 Furthermore, one source estimates that a FOQA program operational on
100 aircraft could save an airline over $2 million annually. See GAO Study, supra
note 195, at 7 (Table 4). For example, Alaska Airlines hopes that by fine tuning
fuel burns, FOQA will save the airline $267,000 in annual fuel costs and $99,000
in brake wear. Presentation slides, Capt. Terry Clark, Alaska Airlines, Just a Few of
219

Safety, AVIATION

the Anticipated Cost Benefits of FOQA (1998).
221 GAO Study, supra note 195, at 7.
222
223

See Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3177 (1996)
See 49 U.S.C. § 40123 (1996).
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mation is consistent with those responsibilities, and disclosing
the information would "inhibit the voluntary provision" of that
type of information. 224 Because the legislative history specifically refers to data-sharing programs such as FOQA, Congress
225
clearly intended § 40123 to apply to these types of initiatives.
Moreover, Congress recognized that absent statutory protection,
"[t]here will be a reluctance to share such information if it will
be publicly released because it could easily be misinterpreted,
misunderstood, or misapplied. '226 But Congress did not implement any specific protections, instead calling on the FAA to develop a program.227
The first FAA response came in the form of a December 1998
notice from FAA Administrator Garvey, outlining FAA policy re228
garding disclosure of information obtained through FOQA.
In the notice, Administrator Garvey described the FAA as generally "committed to limitations on the use of FOQA information
for enforcement purposes. '229 More specifically, the FAA will
refrain "from using deidentified FOQA information to undertake enforcement actions except in egregious cases, i.e., those
that do not meet the conditions listed in section 9, paragraph c
of the Advisory Circular 00-46D governing the Aviation Safety
23
Reporting Program. 0
Seven months later, the FAA issued its second response to 49
U.S.C. § 40123 in the form of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM). 2 3 ' In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to add Part 193 to
the Code of Federal Regulations, designed specifically to protect
voluntarily submitted safety data.23 2 The NPRM also made clear
that because the FAA considered § 40123 an exception to a general governmental emphasis on disclosure, FOQA data would be
protected only if it met five statutory requirements. 23 3 First, the
information must be provided voluntarily. 23 4 Second, the infor224See id. § 40123(a) (1)-(2).
225See H.R. Rep. No. 104-714, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (2000).
226

Id.

227See 49 U.S.C. § 40123(b) ("The Administrator shall issue regulations to
carry out this section.").
2V4 Garvey Notice, supra note 194, at 67505.
229 Id.
230 1t.

See aLho A.C. 00-46D, supra note 151.
231FAA, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information; ProposedRule (july 26, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 FOQA NPRM].
232 1d.
233 Id. at 40473.
234 1i. at 40474 (proposed 14 C.F.R. § 193.5(b)(1)).
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mation must be safety or security related.2 3 5 Third, disclosing
the information would "inhibit the voluntary provision of that
type of information. '2 6 Fourth, receipt of the information contributes to the safety and security responsibilities of the FAA, 9 37
with the [FAA's] safety
and fifth, that information is "consistent
238
and security responsibilities.
Unfortunately, the industry greeted the NPRM with significant opposition. In their respective comments, the Air Transport Association of America,2 39 Continental Airlines, and the Air
Line Pilots Association uniformly criticized the NPRM as a misguided attempt to promote voluntary information exchange,
the net effect of which would be to trigger the "opposite and
unintended effect. ' 24" As a result, they argue, the NPRM contradicts the intent of § 40123 as well as Administrator Garvey's original FOQA policy. In sum, the aviation industry found the
NPRM full of holes, through which Congress' good intent
disappeared.
Generally, the objections were twofold. First, industry groups
feared that proposed Part 193 imparted "broad and arbitrary exceptions to disclosure protection" through which the government and the public could access protected data.2 4 1 For one,
ATA objected to the "unnecessary notice and comment procedure" as well as the FAA's willingness to comply with subpoenas. 24 2 ATA argued that instead of compliance, the FAA should
"take the position that it will not [disclose] such information in
response to a subpoena and, further, that it will take appropriate steps to prevent such information from being disclosed, such
as filing a motion to quash. 2 4 3 Continental Airlines reiterated
that concern by arguing that the NPRM's regulatory structure
incorrectly emphasizes disclosure, rather than non-disclosure.
Instead, Continental "would have preferred to see a regulatory
requirement or at a minimum a strong presumption in favor of
protection of voluntarily provided data and information. '"244
Id. (proposed 14 C.F.R. § 193.5(b) (2)).
1999 FOQA NPRM (proposed 14 C.F.R. § 193.5(b) (3)).
217 Id. (proposed 14 C.F.R. § 193.5(b) (4)).
238 Id. (proposed 14 C.F.R. § 193.5(b) (5)).
239 See supra note 97 (describing the Air Transport Association of America).
240 See Comments of the Air Transport Association of America, Docket No. FAA 1999-6001-18., Sept. 24, 1999, available at www.gainweb.org.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 2.
243 Id. at 3.
244 Id. at 4.
235
236
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Underlying these objections lingers the fear that FAA policy
will allow access to protected data through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 2 5" Generally, the FOIA sets forth a policy
of broad disclosure of government documents "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society ' 246 unless "legitimate governmental and private interests
27
could be harmed by release of certain types of information.
Many in the aviation industry argue that FOQA and ASAP data
should be excluded from FOIA requests as "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential.

' 24 8

Unfortunately, Congress has

not included FOQA data in "Exemption Four" to the FOIA.
And while the legislative history of § 40123 might support its inclusion, Congress left the ultimate decision to the FAA. And as
demonstrated, industry organizations remain concerned 24 that
9
the FAA will not protect FOQA data from FOIA requests.
Second, industry groups objected to provisions authorizing
disclosure of data for FAA surveillance and enforcement activities. The ATA found these provisions contrary to both the policy stated in the 1998 Notice from Administrator Garvey as well
as the plain language of § 40123.2() ALPA argued that "to complete the circle of protection, the [regulation] preventing gov25
ernmental misuse of FOQA and ASAP data must be enacted."

Continental Airlines joined ATA and ALPA, vividly describing its
position:
We are disappointed and disheartened by the FAA's apparent decision to take voluntarily provided sensitive proprietary internal
information and use it as a vehicle for surveillance and in connection with various prosecutions. It appears that the FAA is
more interested in using this information as a tool in applying its
enforcement 'sledge-hammer' instead of utilizing what could be
extraordinary access to voluntarily provided internal sensitive
proprietary information as a safety enhancement tool .... 2
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
247 FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982).
248 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (4) ("Exemption 4."); see also Griffith Slides, supra note
159.
249 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-714, supra note 225; see also GAO Study, supra note
195, at 11.
250 GAO Study, supra note 195, at 5.
251 Comments of the Air Line Pilots Assn., FAA Docket No. 1999-6001-10 (Sept.
13, 1999).
252 Id.
245

246
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In sum, while many industry groups approved of the Rule's
intent and spirit, its operation nonetheless caused them to come
away "extremely disappointed . . .and discouraged. 253

2.

The Year 2000 Legislation and a New N.P.R.M

On April 5, 2000, President Clinton signed H.R. 1000, the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the
21s' Century (also known as AIR-21). 254 While the Ford Act has
been haled by many as generally watershed legislation, it also
specifically impacts FOQA data. In particular, Section 510
reads:
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Administrator shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to
develop procedures to protect air carriersand their employees from en-

forcement actions for violations of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, (other than criminal or deliberate acts) that are reported
or discovered as a result of voluntary reporting programs, such as
the Flight Operations2 Quality
Assurance Program and the Aviation
55
Safety Action Program.

Pursuant to its plain language, § 510 requires the FAA to issue
proposed regulations that enact the protections created by the
statute. The FAA did so in July 2000, issuing a NPRM that proposed amending FAA enforcement procedures.256 In the
NPRM, the FAA sought to balance the competing needs for
trend analysis by airlines as well as allowing the FAA to take corrective action, if needed.257
To balance these objectives, the FAA NPRM first outlines procedures through which airline FOQA programs can gain government approval, including requiring airlines to submit aggregate
FOQA data (although generally not the underlying data) to the
FAA. 258 The FAA will require, however, access to underlying

FOQA data in two circumstances: when needed to promulgate a
new safety rule or when needed to support remedial enforce253 Comments of Continental Airlines, FAA Docket No. 1999-6001-18, 2
(1999).
254 See Statement by President WilliamJ. Clinton Upon Signing H.tL 1000, 36 WEEKLY

COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

745 (Apr. 5, 2000).

See Air-21 Sec. 510, Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000) (emphasis
added).
256 See FOQA NPRM, supra note 147. FAA enforcement procedures are codified at 14 C.F.R. § 13 (2000).
2_57 FOQA NPRM, supra note 147.
258 Id. at 18.
255
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ment action. 259 The NPRM, however, prohibits the FAA from
using FOQA data in a punitive enforcement action, thereby creating the remedial-punitive distinction
that industry groups so
26 0
heavily criticize in their comments.
In addition, the FAA proposal retained the ability to discover
and release FOQA data in a number of circumstances. Despite
disapproving comments after the 1999 NPRM, the FAA may use
FOQA data to correct actions that constitute willful misconduct
or on-going and uncorrected safety issues.2 61 Perhaps more importantly, "[n]othing in the proposed rule would preclude the
FAA from exercising its subpoena authority, and the proposed
rule would not preclude a court of law from ordering the release of FOQA data or information where appropriate. '' 26 2 And
last, the NPRM would not prohibit the use of FOQA data in a
26
criminal prosecution. Principally because of those exceptions to non-disclosure, the
aviation industry did not accept the NPRM with open arms.
This time, in fact, several leading groups submitted ajoint Comment criticizing and attacking the proposed rule as suffering
from the same defects as proposed Part 193.264 In particular, the
Joint Comment found that like its predecessor, the new NPRM
failed to satisfactorily protect FOQA data as well as the parties
submitting that data, while exceeding the authority Congress
granted the FAA to encourage FOQA programs. 26 5 As the Joint
Comment concludes, the fears of disclosure, "will stifle, rather
than encourage, industry participation in this vital safety
26
program."
Beyond renewing previous objections, the Joint Comment attacked the proposal to use FOQA data for FAA enforcement ac259 Id. at 20 (foreseeing only the "remote" possibility of using FOQA data to
support remedial enforcement activities).
260 Id. at 19-21.
261 FOQA NPRM, supra note 147, at 24.
262 Id.
263 Id.

264 SeeJoint Comments, FAA Docket No. 2000-7554-5 (Sept. 28, 2000). The

organizations represented by the Joint Comment are: the Air Transport Association, the Aerospace Industries Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, the
Coalition of Airline Pilots Association, the Independent Association of Continental Pilots, and the Regional Airline Association. Together, the groups represent
almost every major airline and its pilots, along with other industry groups.
265 d. at 3-4.
266 Id. at 2.
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tions. 2 67

Echoing criticisms from the first NPRM, the Joint
Comment reminded the FAA that the "real purpose of FOQA
programs is to enhance safety rather than provide the FAA with
new tools for enforcement actions. '2 6s In fact, the Joint Comment noted that not only is the NPRM "written in tone and
terms of an enforcement tool," but putting the proposed FOQA
program guidelines within the FAA enforcement jurisprudence,
14 C.F.R. § 13, demonstrates the FAA attitude towards FOQA
69
data as one of enforcement.
In addition, the Joint Comment argued that any emphasis on
enforcement contradicts the intent of § 510, as evidenced by
both its plain language and legislative history. Concerning its
plain language, the Joint Comment notes that § 510 does not
qualify "enforcement action" with either 'remedial' or 'punitive'
as the FAA does in the NPRM.2 '" An unqualified term, it argued, "allows only one reasonable construction: the FAA is
barred from pursuing any and all administrative enforcement
actions based on information developed as part of a FOQA program. 2 71 Second, the Joint Committee points out that the legislative history also does not support a 'remedial v. punitive'
distinction, since neither the House or Senate version of the section makes a similar distinction. 7 2 In fact, the Senate Amendment proposed that the protections "applie [d] to all enforcement
actions for violations of the FARs that are reported or discovered as a
result of voluntary reporting programs.' 27 3 The Joint Comment
therefore concluded that using FOQA data for enforcement actions, as supported by the FAA's 'remedial vs. punitive' distinction, is inappropriate and inconsistent with § 510 and alters the
policy articulated in the 1998 Notice from FAA Administrator
Garvey. 7
The Joint Comment's second major objection to the NPRM
stems from FAA proposals to mandate the collection of FOQA
data. Without ambiguity, the Joint Comment states that it is
"unalterably opposed to these proposals. '27 5 The Joint Com267
268

269
270
271
272
273
274
275

Id.
Id.

Joint Comments, supra note 204.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5. See also H.R. Rep.106-513, 106th Congress, 2d Session (2000).
Joint Comments, supra note 264, at 4 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 8.
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ment believes that requiringairlines to submit data exceeds any
previously authorized Congressional power, and Section 510
does nothing to alter that authority.2 7 6 In contrast, during the
demonstration project the FAA could only request FOQA data.2 7 7
In sum, the Joint Comment argued that the NPRM falls far
short of Congress's intent in § 510. Unless modified to reflect
those intentions as well as the issues addressed by the Joint Comment, the industry feels "it is unlikely that even the airlines operating demonstration programs will participate. "278
IX. APPLYING FOQA AND ASAP: THE GLOBAL AVIATION
INFORMATION NETWORK
A.

INTRODUCTION

To achieve the ultimate goal of "zero accidents," in May 1996
FAA Administrator David Hinson recognized that the aviation
industry would need to adopt a "new safety information paradigm '27 9 that emphasized data collection, analysis and dissemination. Reflecting "major advances in information management
technology" (such as FOQA and ASAP) this new paradigm required that the industry "develop a significantly improved operational early warning capability that is sensitive enough to detect
and alert the aviation community to existing and emerging
problems. "280 Realizing that capability, though, depended
largely upon the ability of airlines to share safety information.
Consequently, to facilitate the data sharing between airlines, Administrator Hinson proposed the Global Analysis and Information Network.2 8'
B.

OVERVIEW OF

GAIN

According to the FAA, GAIN (renamed from the global Analysis and Information Network to the Global Aviation Information
Network) is a "voluntary, privately owned and operated network
of systems that collect and use aviation safety information about
flight operations, air traffic control operations, and mainte276

Id.

Id. at 7.
278 Joint Comments, supra note 264, at 6.
279 Federal Aviation Administration, A Callfor the Development of Prototype(s)for a
Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN), 61 Fed. Reg. 21522, 21522 (May
10, 1996). [hereinafter GAIN Proposal].
280 Id. at 21523.
281 Id.
277
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nance to improve aviation safety worldwide. 2 8 2 One aspect of
GAIN, therefore, sets it apart from many other safety programs:
the FAA neither owns nor operates GAIN. Instead, GAIN is
guided by a Steering Committee composed of aviation industry
organizations (including the FAA), that make GAIN a privately
operated, international aviation information network. 28 3 And
though the FAA Office of System Safety (OSS) has served as the
principal GAIN proponent, even the FAA believes that private
ownership will enhance GAIN's potential safety benefits by ena28 4
bling airlines to fly more safely and cost-effectively.
1.

Governmental Support

GAIN is not without government involvement, however. For
one, although the FAA does not serve as a full member of the
GAIN Steering Committee, it does serve as an "ex-officio" member of the Steering Committee.2 8 5 Additionally, in June 2000
the GAIN Steering Committee proposed to form a Government
Support Team (GST) to "further advocate the goals of the GAIN
program and reduce impediments to sharing safety information. ' 286 Initial GST membership includes "civil aviation authorities and accident investigation boards from seven countries" as
well as ICAO and the Joint Aviation Authorities Europe
(JAA). 287 Some degree of government support, therefore, appears crucial to GAIN's eventual success.
In particular, the GAIN Steering Committee believes that government involvement is crucial to reducing the regulatory impediments that stand in the way of data sharing. Consequently,
the Steering Committee assigned that task specifically to the
GST.28 8 In response, the GST immediately established
282

GAIN Overview, supra note 1, at 1.

283 GAIN Proposal, supra note 279, at 21525. See also Global Aviation Information

Network (Aug. 2000) at http://www.gainweb.org [hereinafter GAIN]. For example, Steering Committee members include (among others), Northwest Airlines,
British Airways, Boeing, Airbus, the Air Line Pilots Association, the National Air
Traffic Controller Association, U.S. Navy Aviation Safety, and the International
Association of Machinists.
284 Gain Overview, supra note 1, at 5. See also Edward H. Phillips, Uninhibited
Data Sharing Called Key to Improving Airline Safety, AviATION WK.& SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 23, 2000 available at www.gainweb.org/GAIN_Information/
avweekarticle oct00.html.
285 GAIN, supra note 283.
286 Id. See also GAIN Government Support Team, at http://www.asy.faa.gov/gain/
govt support team/govt__supp-team.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
287 GAIN Government Support Team, supra note 286.
288 Id. See also GAIN, supra note 283.
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"eliminat[ing] legal and organizational barriers that discourage
the collection and sharing of safety information" as one of its
three main areas of focus. 289 To accomplish this task, in 2001

the GST will work to "identify legal and organizational impediments to safety information collection and sharing, as well as
'2
existing solutions. 90

2. A FamiliarSong: Data Protection
As demonstrated by the GST emphasis on removing regulatory impediments, the Steering Committee has identified data
protection as crucial to the success of GAIN. In fact, in January
1998 the FAA OSS enumerated unauthorized data misuse as one
of the biggest problems facing the GAIN program. 9 ' Specifically, the OSS listed four ways the data could be misused, including use for enforcement (either by the government or an
employer), public disclosure of the information, use of the information to support criminal charges, and use of the information to support civil litigation. 9 2 As a reader of this Comment
will recognize, these four misuses of safety data have been identified as potentially impacting every safety initiative discussed in
this Comment. Overcoming these obstructions (like all programs based upon the collection of sensitive safety data) remains crucial to the viability and prosperity of GAIN. As
Administrator Hart maintains, "[a]nything that blocks the [informational] pipeline we're using to get information to improve
safety is very pertinent to GAIN ''21' and to a great extent, ulti-

mately determines the program's success.
X. CONCLUSION
For decades, the aviation industry has debated the appropriate degree of protection to afford aviation safety data. From
cockpit voice recorders in the mid-twentieth century to pro28' Gain Government Support Team, supra note 286.
29
[d. Thus, it appears that the FAA could be playing both offense and defense: contemplating the "misuse" of FOQA data for non-safety, enforcement
purposes while working as a member of the GAIN GST to reduce and alleviate
those "misuses." In any event, the recommendations of the GST are eagerly
awaited.
291 See FAA, Office of System Safety, Aviation Safety Information: Four Potential
Problems; Four Proposed Solutions (Jan. 1998), available at http://www.asy.faa.gov/
gain/GAINinformation/infoprob.htm.
292 Id.
293 Phillips, supra note 284, at 1 (remarks of Christopher A. Hart, Assoc. Administrator for System Safety).
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posed advanced flight data recording in the twenty-first century,
airlines and pilots have long advocated protecting data before
implementing safety programs on a system-wide basis. Not surprisingly, proposals that rely on voluntary submission of data
trigger particularly heated arguments, as aviation professionals
attempt to guard against a "kill the messenger" attitude from
government regulators, the plaintiffs bar, and/or the news
media.
On the other side of the debate, however, reside parties interested in alternative uses for the data. According to this argument, scrutinizing safety data to monitor airline safety
performance is a legitimate use of the data and not a "misuse" as
claimed by pilots. Some degree of public and/or agency disclosure is necessary, therefore, to ensure that airlines fly as safely as
possible. In sum, these groups argue that by keeping a watchful
eye, they also contribute to improving air safety.
Today the debate rages without a clear-cut winner, although
the tide may be turning towards increased data protection, as
evidenced by recent federal legislation aimed at protecting
video and FOQA data. Regardless, the only winner should be the
programs themselves, since improving the availability of detailed
safety information has an unprecedented capacity to improve air
safety. This is particularly true in the case of proactive programs
such as FOQA, ASAP and GAIN. There is merit in recognizing
an unsafe procedure, a confusing approach plate, or an airport
that could be particularly tricky long before the problem
manifests itself in the loss of life. Not only are lives saved, but
once the source of a potential problem is recognized, it can be
permanently removed from the system. With these goals in
mind, all parties involved should arrive at an ultimate solution
that facilitates the growth and development of the new safety
initiatives. For it is these programs and not the individual parties, that provide the greatest potential for reducing the commercial aviation fatal accident rate.
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